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M re.c.C1Untel{ Pf-J Trut-; A-. Tfwfrt,P.S* 
!>tPvr f>resit{tnt ~1-1sh., 
I have read of your call for a Federal Marriage Amendment 
to preserve the sanctity of the traditional marriage between one 
man and one woman.1 The proposed constitutional amendment 
declares that "marriage in the United States shall consist of only 
the union of a man and a woman" and that no federal or state 
constitution can be construed to require otherwise? I was sur-
prised to see such a proposal put forth in light of the failed at-
tempts at such a national marriage amendment in my time dur-
ing the late nineteenth century. For over sixty years from 1884 to 
1947, proposals were made by "pro-family" advocates like you to 
amend the federal Constitution to give Congress the power to 
legislate uniform laws of marriage.3 Until my death in 1902, I was 
one of the leading opponents and most outspoken critics of the 
• Professor of Law, University of Akron. Financial support for this research was 
received from the Faculty Research Committee of The University of Akron. My appre-
ciation goes to James E. MacDonald for all his outstanding research assistance on this 
and other Cady Stanton projects. 
1. See President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Feb. 2, 2005), 
available at http://www. whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02120050202-ll.html; Presi-
dent George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2004), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news!releases/2004/01!20040120-7.html; see also Press Re-
lease, President Calls for Constitutional Amendment Protecting Marriage (Feb. 24, 
2004), available at http://www. whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/print/20040224-2.html. 
2. S.J. Res. 40, 108th Cong., 150 CONG. REC. S7751, S7755 (daily ed. July 7, 2004); 
see H.R.J. Res. 93, 107th Cong. (2002). 
3. See NELSON MANFRED BLAKE, THE ROAD TO RENO: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE 
IN THE UNITED STATES 145-50 (1962); MICHAEL A. MUSMANNO, PROPOSED 
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION: A MONOGRAPH ON THE RESOLUTIONS 
INTRODUCED IN CONGRESS PROPOSING AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 104, 108 (1929). None of these proposals ever came to a 
vote in either house, and only once were they given formal committee action. BLAKE, 
supra, at 145. In 1892, the House Judiciary Committee voted against the proposed con-
gressional marriage amendment based on concerns of the Southern Democrats against 
continuing the expansion of federal power begun in the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fif-
teenth Amendments and over opposition to interracial marriage that was threatened to 
be legalized under a uniform marriage law. /d. at 146 (citing H.R. 1290, "Marriage and 
Divorce," 52 Cong. 1st Sess. 1-8 (May 5, 1892)). 
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proposed marriage amendment of the prior century. I write to 
you now to advise you of the substantial grounds that I advanced 
against a constitutional marriage amendment, for the arguments 
continue to be relevant and applicable today. 
The outcry for a uniform national marriage law rang loud as 
I approached my ninetieth year. I weighed in on the issue, as I 
did with all issues of importance to women, speaking at lectures 
and professing my views in the newspapers of the day.4 Indeed, I 
was as "radical on the marriage question at the age of eighty-six 
as I had been a half century earlier."5 Throughout my career, I 
agitated for equality in marriage, challenging the traditional 
marital patriarchy and advocating for marital property rights for 
women, elimination of the word "obey" from the marriage cere-
mony, the retention of a wife's birth name, and no-fault divorce. 
With the advent of a national conservative movement 
against divorce in 1884, I articulated a multi-pronged analytical 
attack on the constitutional amendment. Marriage reformers 
then, as now, claimed the need of an amendment to protect 
against the exportation of liberal state laws of marriage through 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Yet, it seems to me that such 
claims of threats to federalism are mere pretexts for social tar-
gets-first women, and now homosexuals. I opposed the federal 
marriage amendment of the nineteenth century on grounds that 
it stunted state democratic action, perpetuated gender discrimi-
nation in the family, and denied the true contractual relation of 
marriage. 6 I recount those arguments here in the hope that per-
4. See Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Are Homogenous Divorce Laws in AU The States 
Desirable?, 170 No. AMER. REV. 405, Mar. 1900, in THE PAPERS OF EUZABETH CADY 
STANTON AND SUSAN B. ANTHONY, Reel 41, pp.186-90 (41:186-90) (Patricia G. Hol-
land & Ann D. Gordon eds. 1991, microfilm) (hereinafter "STANTON PAPERS"); Eliza-
beth Cady Stanton, The Need of Liberal Divorce Laws, 139 NO. AMER. REV. 243 (1884), 
in STANTON PAPERS 23:951; Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Divorce Versus Domestic Warfare, 
1 ARENA 560, April1890, in STANTON PAPERS 28:324; Elizabeth Cady Stanton, National 
Law for Divorce, Nov. 15, 1899 (unidentified newspaper clipping), in STANTON PAPERS 
40:227; Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Are Homogeneous Divorce Laws in All the States Desir-
able?, BOSTON INV., Dec. 17, 1891, in STANTON PAPERS 38:1011; Elizabeth Cady 
Stanton, Are Homogeneous Divorce Laws in All the States Desirable?, Address to the 
Nat'! Leg. League (Feb. 24, 1902), in STANTON PAPERS 42:576; Elizabeth Cady Stanton, 
Divorce in the Several States, N.Y. EVE. J., May 18, 1899, in STANTON PAPERS 39:876; 
Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Elizabeth Cady Stanton's Last Plea for Women, A Symposium, 
An. XVII, N.Y. AMER. J., Oct. 28, 1902, in STANTON PAPERS 42:861 ; Elizabeth Cady 
Stanton, How Shall We Solve the Divorce Problem? A Symposium, Art. I, N.Y. AMER. J., 
Oct. 13, 1902, in STANTON PAPERS 42:787. 
5. BLAKE, supra note 3, at 150-51; ECS, National Law, supra note 4. 
6. See infra text pp. 108-23. 
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haps they might be persuasive with regard to the parallel Federal 
Marriage Amendment championed in this new millennium. 
HISTORY AS A GUIDE 
Perhaps I should begin by introducing myself properly. You 
have referred to me in passing as a "courageous hero" when 
proclaiming presidential support for Women's Equality Days.7 
Others know me as a reformer who agitated for woman's suf-
frage with my cohort Susan B. Anthony.8 Still others have re-
membered me as the leading philosopher and ideologue of the 
nineteenth-century woman's movement, even calling me "the 
most brilliant and dynamic feminist theorist" of the day.9 Indeed, 
I spent most of my adult life from 1848 to 1902 working for the 
advancement of women's rights beginning with the first meeting 
on the woman question at Seneca Falls, New York. 10 This mo-
mentous first meeting has been memorialized in recent times in 
the monument to my work created at the National Women's 
Rights Park in Seneca Falls. 11 There, etched on the walls flowing 
with water are the words I wrote in the Declaration of Sentiments 
declaring equality for women in all aspects of social, political, 
and civil life. 
In the Declaration of Sentiments, you will find my panoptic 
philosophy for the ultimate equality and empowerment of 
women. 12 Included in this broad agenda are attacks on the patri-
archal marriage relation and calls for divorce reform so that 
women could escape unharmonious marriages. 13 As I often re-
7. Proclamation No. 7584, Women's Equality Day 2002,67 Fed. Reg. 55,317 (Aug. 
23, 2002); see also Proclamation No. 7695, Women's Equality Day 2003, 68 Fed. Reg. 
51,673 (Aug. 26, 2003). 
8. ELLEN CAROL DUBOIS, THE ELIZABETH CADY STANTON-SUSAN B. 
ANTHONY READER: CORRESPONDENCE, WRITINGS, SPEECHES (1981); GEOfFREY C. 
WARD & KEN BURNS, NOT FOR OURSELVES ALONE: THE STORY OF ELIZABETH CADY 
STANTON AND SUSAN B. ANTHONY (1999) (book depicting film documentary of the 
same name); 1 THE SELECTED PAPERS OF ELIZABETH CADY STANTON AND SUSAN B. 
ANTHONY, 79-81 (Ann D. Gordon, ed.,1997) (hereinafter "SELECTED PAPERS"). 
9. ELISABETH GRIFFITH, IN HER OWN RIGHT: THE LIFE OF ELIZABETH CADY 
STANTON xiii (1984); Elizabeth B. Clark, Matrimonial Bonds: Slavery and Divorce in 
Nineteenth-Century America, 8 LAW & HIST. REV. 25, 26 (1990); Ellen DuBois, On La-
bor and Free Love: Two Unpublished Speeches of Elizabeth Cady Stanton, 1 SIGNS 257, 
257 (1975). 
10. JUDITH WELLMAN, THE ROAD TO SENECA FALLS: ELIZABETH CADY 
STANTON AND THE FIRST WOMAN'S RIGHTS CONVENTION (2004). 
11. See Women's Rights National Historical Park, 16 U.S.C. § 41011 (2004). 
12. Declaration of Sentiments, Report of the Woman's Rights Convention, Held at 
Seneca Falls, N.Y. (July 19-20, 1848}, in SELECTED PAPERS, supra note 8, at 79-81. 
13. !d. at 79. 
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peated, liberal divorce laws for oppressed wives are what Canada 
was for Southern slaves, 14 especially given the fact that the vast 
majority of applications for divorce in the late nineteenth cen-
tury were made by women. 15 During my five decades of agita-
tion, I strongly advocated for the no-fault divorce that I believed 
was critical to achieving equality and partnership for women 
within marriages.16 Others labeled me an advocate of "easy di-
vorce," yet I hate and repudiate that phrase, and the promiscuous 
relations it seems to indicate. What I have always insisted on is 
that the laws of marriage and divorce, whatever they are, shall 
bear equally on man and woman.17 As I recounted in my mem-
oirs, Eighty Years and More: 
So bitter was the opposition to divorce, for any cause, that but 
few dared to take part in the discussion. I was the only woman, 
for many years, who wrote and spoke on the question .... I 
was always courageous in saying what I saw to be true, for the 
simple reason that I never dreamed of opposition. What 
seemed to me to be rW,ht I thought must be equally plain to all 
other rational beings. 
Of course, it must be said that I never sought the avenue of di-
vorce for myself, having remained married to the lawyer and re-
former Henry B. Stanton for over fifty years. 19 During this time, 
14. ECS, Liberal Divorce Laws, supra note 4, at 243; Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Edi-
torial Correspondence, REVOL., Dec. 23, 1869, in STANTON PAPERS, supra note 4, at 
2:192; ECS, National Law, supra note 4; see also ECS, Several Stales, supra note 4; see 
Clark, supra note 9, at 30-34 (discussing the analogy of marriage and slavery used by 
nineteenth-century reformers and Stanton). 
15. ECS, Liberal Divorce Laws, supra note 4, at 243; see NORMA BASCH, FRAMING 
AMERICAN DIVORCE: FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION TO THE VICTORIANS 
(1999). 
16. See ELIZABETH CADY STANTON, EIGHTY YEARS AND MORE: 
REMINISCENCES, 1815-1897 ch. XIV. Views on Marriage and Divorce, 215-33 (1898); 
GLENDA RILEY, DIVORCE: AN AMERICAN TRADmON 73-75 (1991) (detailing Cady 
Stanton's advocacy in support of divorce); Qark, supra note 9, at 26. 
17. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Mrs. Stanton to Mr. Hooker, REVOL., Feb. 24, 1870, in 
STANTON PAPERS, supra note 4, at 2:271. 
18. REMINISCENCES, supra note 16, at 216; see WILLIAM L. O'NEILL, DIVORCE IN 
THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 206, 229 (1967) ("For longer than most Americans could re-
member, Elizabeth Cady Stanton had stood for free divorce .... Mrs. Stanton was un-
surpassed, of course, in vigor, wit, and clarity of discourse, but she had been speaking on 
divorce for such a long time that it was possible to disregard her."). 
19. REMINISCENCES, supra note 16, at 71; Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Letter to the 
Editor, Mrs. Stanton's Views on Marriage and Divorce, NATION, May 26, 1898, in 
STANTON PAPERS, supra note 4, at 38:548; Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Diary Entry, Jan. 1, 
1898, in 2 ELIZABETH CADY STANTON AS REVEALED IN HER LETTERS, DIARY AND 
REMINISCENCES 330-31 (Theodore Stanton & Harriot Stanton Blatch eds., 1922); LOIS 
W. BANNER, ELIZABETH CADY STANTON: A RADICAL FOR WOMAN'S RIGHTS 35 
(1980) (stating that Cady Stanton denied that her liberal views of divorce derived from 
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I could not have been more "pro-family" as I single-handedly 
raised seven children. 
I summarized the tensions surrounding the proposed na-
tional marriage amendment in my testimony before the United 
States Senate Special Select Committee on Woman Suffrage in 
1890: 
There is much anxiety just now being expressed by distin-
guished statesmen, judges, bishops, lest the foundations of our 
homes are about to be swept away by liberal divorce laws. So 
strong is this feeling that a demand has been made on Congress 
for a national law, that will make the code regulating marriage 
and divorce homogeneous throughout the states. Congress has 
already made an appropriation to gather statistics on this ques-
tion. Carroll D. Wright who was employed to make the report, 
states that there are 10,000 divorces every year, and other statis-
ticians say the majority are asked for by women. 20 
Beginning in the late nineteenth century, conservative mar-
riage reformers sought to preserve the family and protect against 
state idiosyncrasies that purported to impose easy divorce upon 
all the states. Divorce colonies in South Dakota, Indiana, and 
Iowa raised the ire of church and state leaders nationwide by 
their alleged promotion of divorce through laws providing short 
residency requirements and liberal fault grounds for divorce.21 I 
had heard such a hue and cry about Indiana's divorce laws that I 
was quite surprised when visiting there in 1870 on a lecture tour to 
find the mass of men and women living in the same harmonious, 
faithful relations as in my native state, where divorces are unhon-
ored and unknown.22 Nonetheless, Theodore Woolsey, attorney 
and retired president of Yale University, formed the New Eng-
land Divorce Reform League which soon grew to national 
prominence as the National League for the Protection of the 
FamilX under the direction of Congregational minister Samuel 
Dike. 3 Comprised of Protestant and Catholic clergy, lawyers, 
and later social scientists, the group championed the cause of a 
her own negative experiences with men). 
20. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Address of Mrs. Elizabeth Cady Stanton before the 
United States Senate Special Committee on Woman Suffrage, in behalf of Senate Reso-
lution (Feb. 8, 1890), in STANTON PAPERS, supra note 4, at 28:4, 6. 
21. O'NEILL, supra note 18, at 231; RILEY, supra note 16, at 63, 98, 102, 110. 
22. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Editorial Correspondence, REVOL., Mar. 17, 1870, in 
STANTON PAPERS, supra note 4, at 2:295. 
23. LYNNE CAROL HALEM, DIVORCE REFORM: CHANGING LEGAL AND SOCIAL 
PERSPECTIVES 34 (1980); RILEY, supra note 16, at 108-09; SELECTED ARTICLES ON 
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 2 (Julia E. Johnsen ed., 1925). 
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uniform national divorce code.24 The League convinced Con-
gress to fund national statistical studies of marriage and divorce, 
resulting in the Wright Report of 1887, our first U.S. Census?5 
The results of this report demonstrated an increase in the di-
vorce rate which spurred agitation for a national restriction on 
divorce.26 
However, to my mind, the divorce rate per se was not a 
cause of concern, but perhaps even one for celebration. As two-
thirds of the divorces were granted to women on grounds of cru-
elty and non-support,27 the laws permitted women's legal escape 
from destructive marriages that had so long been denied. The in-
stances of domestic violence and brutal, battering husbands fu-
eled my support of divorce as a necessity for women?8 There 
had been several aggravated cases of cruelty to wives among the 
Dutch aristocracy in my home state of New York.29 My feelings 
had been stirred to their depths very early in life by the sufferings 
of a dear friend of mine, at whose wedding I was one of the 
bridesmaids. In listening to the facts in her case, my mind was 
fully made up as to the wisdom of a liberal divorce law. 30 She was 
married ostensibly to a gentleman, but in reality to a brute. At 
their marriage a place in New Jersey was given to him worth 
$60,000-the next day his creditors had it. He stole her jewels, 
clothes-everything she had. She told me about it. I told her to 
leave him. Her parents wouldn't take her back. A year later she 
appeared, thinly clad, with a baby in her arms, at my door. I took 
24. James P. Lichtenberger, Origin of Divorce, 7, 24, in MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, 
supra note 23; BASCH, supra note 15, at 89. 
25. RILEY, supra note 16, at 79, 110. 
26. Ironically, the author of these reports, Carroll Wright, came out in favor of di-
vorce. See O'NEILL, supra note 18, at 205. The Congressional studies showed 10,000 di-
vorces in 1887 and 25,000 divorces in 1898. See MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, supra note 
23, at 2 (reporting that the congressional censuses showed 122,121 divorces for 1867-
1876, 2,065,595 divorces for 1877-1889, 352,263 divorces for 1887-1896, and 593,363 di-
vorces for 1897-1906); Lichtenberger, supra note 24, at 25 (summarizing Department of 
Labor reports that counted 43,850 divorces in 1867-1870, and 949,746 divorces in 1871-
1888 and reported a rising divorce rate of 28 per 100,000 population in 1870 to 112 per 
100,000 in 1916). In comparison, the most recent studies from 2003-04 report over 1 mil-
lion divorces annually. Center for Disease Control, Births, Marriages, Divorces, and 
Deaths: Provisional Data for June 2004, 53 Nat'l Vit. Stats. Rep. No. 11 (Dec. 9, 2004). 
27. RILEY, supra note 16, at 79,90 (citing Wright Report, U.S. Dep't of Commerce 
& Labor, Marriage and Divorce). 
28. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Divorce, LILY, Apr. 1850, in SELECTED PAPERS, supra 
note 8, at 162-63; Elizabeth Cady Stanton, An Appeal to the Women of the State of New 
York: By the President of the Women's New York State Temperance Society, July 1, 1852, 
in SELECTED PAPERS, supra note 8, at 201-02. 
29. REMINISCENCES, supra note 16, at 215. 
30. !d. at 216. 
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care of her. 31 We read Milton's essays on divorce together and 
were thoroughly convinced as to the right and duty not only of 
separation, but of absolute divorce. 32 
Despite my arguments, the national outcry against divorce 
continued, and, in 1884, congressional leaders resgonded by 
proposing a constitutional amendment on marriage. Concerns 
over curbing the divorce rate and prohibiting Mormon polyg~ 
sparked the national effort of a uniform marriage standard. 4 
Amendments were continuously proposed over the span of sixty 
years intended to give Congress the power to enact national 
marriage and divorce legislation.35 It was believed at the time 
that without such an amendment, Congress lacked the power to 
legislate on such local matters of marriage and divorce.36 Per-
haps that assumption no longer holds true as Congress seems to 
have in fact legislated marriage in the 1996 Defense of Marriage 
Act.37 Nonetheless, the focus of the nineteenth-century move-
ment was on institutionalizing the marriage standard in a federal 
constitutional amendment. The call for federal action on mar-
riage continued after my death, when President Theodore Roo-
sevelt took up the issue in 1906, stating: 
I am well aware of how difficult it is to pass a constitutional 
amendment. Nevertheless in my judgment the whole question 
of marriage and divorce should be relegated to the authority 
of the National Congress. At present the wide differences in 
the laws of the different States on this subject result in scan-
dals and abuses; surely there is nothing so vitally essential to 
the welfare of the nation, nothing around which the nation 
should so bend itself to throw every safeguard, as the home 
life of the average citizen. 38 
31. ECS, Several States, supra note 4. 
32. REMINISCENCES, supra note 16, at 216. 
33. 15 CONG. REC. 279 (daily ed. Jan. 8, 1884). 
34. BLAKE, supra note 3, at 145. 
35. /d. at 145. For further discussion of these various proposals see MUSMANNO, 
supra note 3, at 104-07. 
36. MUSMANNO, supra note 3, at 104 ("That the States have absolute jurisdiction 
over the subjects of marriage and divorce there can be no doubt. No direct mention 
thereof is made in the Constitution; and the only indirect reference, that which prohibits 
a State from the impairment of contractual obligations (Art. I, sec. 10), has been con-
strued not to refer to the matrimonial relation."); Mrs. Edward Franklin White, Deputy 
Attorney General of Indiana, America's Need of a Federal Marriage and Divorce Law, in 
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, supra note 23 ("It is the almost unanimous opinion of law-
yers who have considered the question that an amendment to the Constitution is neces-
sary to enable Congress to pass such a law."). 
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1738(c) (2000). 
38. BLAKE, supra note 3, at 146 (President Roosevelt's annual address to Con-
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As is so often said, it seems to be true that history does indeed 
repeat itself. Thus, it may be that the arguments I articulated 
over one-hundred years ago continue to be relevant today. 
INSTITUTIONAL ANXIETY AND FEDERALIST 
CONCERNS 
The call for a Federal Marriage Amendment in both centu-
ries has thrived upon what Professor Mae Kuykendall has called 
in this century the "institutional anxiety" of federalism.39 The 
fear of opponents of liberalized marriage at each point in time 
has been that states would be required to recognize marital rela-
tionships contrary to the preference of the local community. In 
the nineteenth century, the institutional anxiety stemmed from 
interstate conflicts over diverse divorce laws that encouraged 
migratory divorce and mandated state recognition of such di-
vorces and subsequent marriages under the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.40 Today, the institutional anxi-
ety argument arises from interstate differences in gay marriage 
laws created by so-called "activist" judges and the "specter of 
the Full, Faith and Credit juggernaut" requiring sister state rec-
ognition of these laws.41 As Professor Kuykendall explains, the 
extensive rhetoric about activist judges asserts that it is problem-
atic for judges to issue non-majoritarian decisions with respect to 
gay marriage in the guise of judicial review.42 At bottom, the ar-
gument is framed as a concern over anti-democratic action which 
can be blocked only by federal constitutional amendment, 
thereby preserving the will of the majority.43 
It appears, Mr. President, that this is your primary argument 
in favor of the Federal Marriage Amendment. As you expressed 
in the January 2004 State of the Union address: "If judges insist 
gress). 
39. Mae Kuykendall, The President, Gay Marriage, and the Constitution: A Tangled 
Web, 13 WIDENER L. REV. 799, 810, 813 (2004). 
40. BLAKE, supra note 3, at 173-78; MUSMANNO, supra 3, at 104--05; HALEM, supra 
note 23, at 37-39. 
41. Kuykendall, supra note 39, at 813. 
42 /d. 
43. !d. at 810 n.26; see 150 CONG. REC. S7871, S7872 (daily ed. July 9, 2004) (state-
ment of Sen. Allard) ("Any redefinition of marriage has been driven entirely by the body 
of government that remains unaccountable and unelected - the courts."); 150 CONG. 
REC. H7898, H7910 (Sept. 30, 2004) (statement of Rep. Smith) ("[J]udicial activism in 
America has reached a crisis. Judges routinely overrule the will of the people, invent so-
called rights and ignore traditional values. Recently, judges have even changed the defi-
nition of marriage. Most Americans simply do not want judges to dictate a new kind of 
marriage that is so different from the one that has served so many so well for so long."). 
2005] ELIZABETH CADY STANTON LETTER 145 
on forcing their arbitrary will upon the people, the only alterna-
tive left to the people would be the constitutional process. Our 
nation must defend the sanctity of marriage. "44 Members of the 
Senate and the House of Representatives have echoed this con-
cern of judge-imposed change against the will of the people.45 
For example, in September 2004, Representative JoAnn Davis 
of Virginia decried: 
[A]ctivists in the judiciary, as evidenced by the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court deciding that there is no rational rea-
son for restricting the benefits of marriage to heterosexual 
couples, seem bent on redefining marriage for an entire Na-
tion in direct opposition to the wishes of the vast majority of 
Americans and with a flagrant disregard for the millennia-old 
institution of marriage that has been responsible for the suc-
cessful propagation of the human race.46 
Representative Pence of Indiana emphasized his concern with 
the judiciary's abuse of power: 
The United States Supreme Court ... has in recent decisions 
signaled a willingness to extend the right of privacy to certain 
types of behavior which could very well . . . recognize gay 
marriage. . . . Activist lawyers and their allies in the legal 
academy over the last decade have devised a strategy to over-
ride the public opinion. . . . The activists have, . . . literally 
plotted a State-by-State strategy to increase the number of ju-
dicial decisions mandating same sex marriage. The goal is to 
force the same sex marriage issue on the Nation piecemeal 
and then to demand the United States Supreme Court order 
the holdout States to accept and do the same.47 
A Federal Marriage Amendment does indeed block judicial 
action as intended. However, it also produces the negative con-
sequence of blocking democratic experimentation of the local 
community as it grapples with social issues in the name of pro-
44. 2004 State of the Union Address, supra note 1. 
45. See e.g., 150 CONG. REC. S7871 (July 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Allard); 150 
CONG. REc. S7876 (July 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Hatch); 150 CONG. REC. S7883 (July 
9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Frist); 150 CONG. REC. H7895 (Sept. 30, 2004) (statement of 
Rep. Musgrave); 150 CONG. REc. H7898, H7900 (Sept. 30, 2004) (statement of Rep. 
Feeney); 150 CONG. REC. H7898, H7902 (Sept. 30, 2004) (statement of Rep. Carter); 150 
CONG. REc. H7898, H7904 (Sept. 30, 2004) (statement of Rep. Gingrey); 150 CoNo. 
REc. H7898, H7906 (Sept. 30, 2004) (statement of Rep. Neugebauer); 150 CONG. REC. 
H7898, H7910 (Sept. 30, 2004) (statement of Rep. Smith); 150 CoNG. REC. H7898, 
H7910 (Sept. 30, 2004) (statement of Rep. Akin). 
46. 150 CONG. REc. H7825, H7827 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2004) (statement of Rep. 
Davis). 
47. /d. at H7826 (statement of Rep. Pence). 
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gress. In 1932, some years after my death, Justice Brandeis em-
phasized the national danger in prohibiting such experimenta-
tion: 
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a 
grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be 
fraught with serious consequences to the nation. It is one of 
the happy incidents of the federal system that a single coura-
geous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; 
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to 
the rest of the country.48 
Such experimentation in legal reform at the state level is a 
cornerstone of our American democracy and, as I argued, should 
not be eliminated by a constitutional amendment. 
The Constitutional Straightjacket 
I addressed the concerns of states' rights in countering the 
federal marriage amendment in two important articles, Divorce 
Versus Domestic Warfare (1890) and Are Homogeneous Divorce 
Laws in All the States Desirable? (1900): 
There is a demand just now for an amendment to the United 
States Constitution that shall make the laws of Marriage and 
Divorce the same in all the States of the Union. As this sugges-
tion comes uniformly from those who consider the present di-
vorce laws too liberal, we may infer that the proposed National 
Law is to place the whole question on a narrower basis, render-
ing null and void the laws that have been passed in a broader 
spirit, according to the needs and experiences in certain sec-
tions, of the sovereign people. And here let us bear in mind, 
that the widest possible law would not make divorce obligatory 
on anyone, while a restricted law, on the contrary, would com-
pel many living perhaps at one time under more liberal laws, to 
remain in uncongenial relations. 49 
It is clear that a constitutional amendment that restricts the 
power of states to recognize marriages does not in fact preserve 
all states' rights. Instead, it discriminates between the states in 
favor of the conservative states that seek to restrict marriage.50 
States with a broader spirit of inclusiveness, such as Iowa and 
48. New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 386-87 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting). 
49. ECS, Divorce Versus Domestic Warfare, supra note 4, at 560; ECS, Homoge-
nous Divorce Laws, supra note 4, at 407. 
50. ECS, Several States, supra note 4. 
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Wyoming in my time or Massachusetts and Vermont today, are 
confined by the constitutional straightjacket that denies respect 
to their state actions both inside and outside their borders. The 
creation of such second-class states does not promote federalist 
concerns of states' rights, but instead promotes certain states 
ahead of others. Simply examine the evidence. 
Democracy and Local Experimentation 
In 1890, I argued repeatedly against the federal marriage 
amendment in articles appearing in several journals and news-
papers.51 My opposition focused on the amendment's squelching 
of democratic experimentation in the state laboratories of pro-
gress: 
There are many advantages in leaving all these questions, as 
now, to the States. Local self-government more readily permits 
on mooted questions, which are the outcome of the needs and 
convictions of the community. The smaller the area over which 
legislation extends, the more pliable are the laws. By leaving the 
States free to experiment in their local affairs, we can judge of 
the working of different laws under varying circumstances, and 
thus learn their comparative merits. The progress education has 
achieved in America is due to just this fact - that we have left 
our system of public instruction in the hands of local authori-
ties. How different would be the solution of the great educa-
tional question of manual labor in the schools, if the matter had 
to be settled at Washington! The whole nation might find itself 
pledged to a scheme that a few years would prove wholly im-
practicable. Not only is the town meeting, as Emerson says, 
"the cradle of American liberties," but it is the nursery of Yan-
k . d . d 52 ee expenment an wzs om. 
In the nineteenth century, the local experimentation with 
marital issues focused on divorce. Legislatures across the coun-
try experimented with the appropriate fault grounds for divorce, 
testing out each new idea as circumstances required. Some states 
like Indiana experimented with liberal use of fault grounds for 
divorce including cruelty, desertion, and intemperance.53 Others, 
like my home state of New York, permitted divorce only for 
51. ECS, Divorce Versus Domestic Warfare, supra note 4; ECS, Women's Tribune, 
supra note 4; ECS, Homogeneous Laws, Boston, supra note 4. 
52. ECS, Divorce Versus Domestic Warfare, supra note 45, at 561; ECS, Women's 
Tribune, supra note 4; ECS, Homogeneous Laws, supra note 4, at 408. 
53. REMINISCENCES, supra note 16, at 215; ECS, Several States, supra note 4. 
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adultery.54 I went before the New York legislature in 1860 ask-
ing that law be enacted granting divorce for drunkenness, licen-
tiousness and incompatibility of temper, but I failed. 55 You 
would have thought that I had made a violent attack upon the 
foundation of the National Government. 56 South Carolina pro-
hibited all divorce and was proud to say it had never granted a 
divorce since the time of the Revolution.57 Judge Robert Grant 
of South Carolina boasted: "What! Model our marriage and di-
vorce laws, the safeguards of the 'home,' to suit the idiosyncra-
sies of 'highbrows' or 'visionaries' in New York, Massachusetts, 
or elsewhere?"58 
However, just as the states were beginning to work through 
the issues of divorce, conservative foes intervened seeking to 
curtail this democracy in action by promoting a national law re-
stricting divorce. In proposing an amendment to the national 
constitution, to make the laws homogeneous from Maine to 
Texas, the question naturally suggests itself, on what basis should 
this general law be enacted? On the progressively freer laws of di-
vorce that the true American sovereign of the West will surely de-
mand, or on more restrictive legislation?59 It is evident that the 
proponents were inclined to the latter. 
Yet the most conservative rule is not always the best. While 
South Carolina is proud of its history as the only State in the Un-
ion where a divorce has not been granted since the Revolution, 
the marriages there are not necessarily models of marital peace 
and harmony. For example, South Carolina had a statute regu-
lating the portion of a husband's property that may be given at 
death to his concubine.60 In another example, the South Carolina 
court was called upon in the case of Jelineau v. Jelineau to re-
solve the legal issues of maintenance and support raised by the 
unharmonious cohabitation of a husband, his wife, their child, 
his female slave, and her child by the husband.61 
54. REMINISCENCES, supra note 16, at 215; ECS, Several States, supra note 4. 
55. ECS, Several States, supra note 4; see Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Address on the 
Divorce Bill Before the Judiciary Committee of the New York Senate (Feb. 8, 1861}, in 
STANTON PAPERS, supra note 4, at 9:1101. 
56. ECS, Several States, supra note 4. 
57. ECS, Liberal Divorce Laws, supra note 4, at '137. 
58. Judge Robert Grant, A Call to a New Crusade, GOOD HOUSE. 42, 143 (Sept. 
1921). 
59. ECS, Liberal Divorce Laws, supra note 4, at '137. 
60. /d. 
61. /d. Cady Stanton incorrectly reported that the court compelled this extended 
family to live on in "peace, purity, and felicity." /d. at 238. Instead, the court rejected its 
precedents requiring the resumption of the marital home, and remanded the case for 
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Moreover, South Carolina cannot hope to preserve its 
peaceful state of mandated marital unity by way of a federal 
amendment. For a uniform law creating divorce on any ground 
threatens the power of that state to prohibit absolute divorce 
within its own borders. And some incarnations of the federal 
marriage law would have permitted divorce for adultery, deser-
tion, neglect, and cruelty.6 
State experimentation is just as pronounced in today's issue 
of same-sex partnerships. The quick reactions at the state level 
to this important issue have exhibited a range of responses from 
the local community that are far from unidirectional. For exam-
ple, Massachusetts now permits gay marriage.63 Vermont pro-
vides all the legal benefits of marriage under an alternative legal 
construct of the civil union.64 Massachusetts considered this civil 
union option, but rejected it finding that the civil union status 
perpetuated the second class citizenship of gay partners.65 Cali-
fornia has domestic partnerships with enumerated rights of part-
ners to inherit, make medical decisions, and sue for wrongful 
death.66 Hawaii has reciprocal beneficiaries providing limited le-
gal rights for same-sex partners and other dependents such as 
elderly parents.67 Alaska has a constitutional amendment ban-
ning gay marriage.68 Ohio has a constitutional amendment pro-
hibiting gay marriage, civil unions, and domestic partnerships.69 
Thus, clearly, there is a diversity of opinion in the United States 
among the citizens as to what legal status should be given to gay 
partners. It is simply too early to end the experimentation which 
began in earnest only at the tum of the millennium. 
award of maintenance and child support for the wife's establishment of a separate home. 
See Jelineau v. Jelineau, 2 Des. 45 (S.C. App. 1801), available at 1801 WL 333, *4. 
62. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, supra note 23, at 5 (reporting on proposed bill of 
1923). 
63. Goodridge v. Dep't of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
64. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 §§ 1201, 1204 (adopted 1999); Baker v. Vermont, 744 
A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (holding that failure of state to provide equal benefits of marriage to 
same-sex partners violated equality clause of state constitution). 
65. In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004). 
66. CAL. FAM. CODE§ 297 (West 2006). 
67. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.§§ 572C-1 to -7 (adopted 1998). 
68. ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 25 (adopted 1999); see Kevin G. Clarkson, et al., The 
Alaska Marriage Amendment: The People's Choice on the Last Frontier, 16 ALASKA L. 
REV. 213 (1999). 
69. OH. CONST. amend. XV,§ 11 (adopted December 2, 2004). 
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Religious Amendment Without Ecclesiastical Consensus 
The religious fervor that has fueled the call for a federal 
amendment proceeds despite the absence of ecclesiastical con-
sensus as to the proper substance of the amendment, as I argued 
for more than a decade beginning in 1890: 
Moreover, as we are still in the experimental stage on this ques-
tion, we are not qualified to make a perfect law, that would 
work satisfactorily, over so vast an area as our boundaries now 
embrace. I see no evidence in what has been published on this 
question of late by statesmen, ecclesiastics, lawyers, and judges, 
that any of them have thought sufficiently on the subject, to 
prepare a well-digested code or a comprehensive amendment to 
the National Constitution. 10 
The lack of consensus demonstrated by the various state 
laws of domestic partnerships is replicated in the debate today 
within the Protestant church over gay marriage and homosexual-
ity. For example, the Unitarian Church performs and supports 
same-sex unions.71 The United Church of Christ permits com-
mitment ceremonies for gay partners, and opposes the Federal 
Marriage Amendment.72 The Episcopal Church endorsed a gay 
bishop, but then saw part of its national congregation secede and 
continue under the international umbrella of the more conserva-
tive Anglican Church.73 Individual Methodist ministers in Chi-
cago, Nebraska, and San Francisco have performed celebration 
ceremonies for gay partners.74 I am not surprised by the Method-
ists, as they were the first to recognize the inherent equality of 
partners in marriage by eliminating the word "obey" from the 
traditional marria~e ceremony, as I did in my own wedding 
ceremony in 1840. 5 The Lutheran Church recently conducted a 
70. ECS, Divorce Versus Domestic Warfare, supra note 4, at 560-61; ECS, Homo-
geneous Laws, supra note 4, at 407. 
71. See Unitarian Universalist Association, http://www.uua.org (last visited Feb. 16, 
2006). 
72. United Church of Christ, Executive Council, Call to Action and Invitation to 
Dialogue on Marriage (April26, 2004), available at www.ucc.org/news. 
73. Bishops Approve Robinson, EPIS. NEWS SERV., Aug. 6, 2003, available at 
www .episcopalchurch.org. 
74. See United Methodist Church Web Site, www.urnc.org (last visited Feb .. 16, 
2006). 
75. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Address at the Anniversary of the National Woman 
Suffrage Association, REVOL., May 19, 1870, in STANTON PAPERS, supra note 4, at 
22:363; Mrs. Elizabeth Cady Stanton's Address at the Decade Meeting, on Marriage and 
Divorce, Report of the Proceedings of the Twentieth Anniversary Celebration of the In-
auguration of the Woman's Rights Movement, New York, Oct. 20, 1870, in STANTON 
PAPERS, supra note 4, at 14:1031, 1035; Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Reminiscences, Bishop 
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nationwide study of its lay members' opinions on blessing same-
sex relationships and ordaining gay clergy.76 As a result of that 
study, the Lutheran Church decided not to alter current church 
policy permitting ordination of celibate gay clergy, yet prohibit-
ing gay marriage.77 However, it recommended that the church 
refrain from disciplining conscious objectors in local congrega-
tions who approve partnered gay clergy or bless same-sex un-
ions.78 
Thus, ecclesiastical as well as judicial and legislative authori-
ties are still experimenting with social responses to the reality of 
gay partners. A federal amendment stops such experimentation 
in democracy and self-governance and halts social progress in its 
tracks. 
DECONSTRUCTING THE TRUE RELATION OF 
MARRIAGE 
Underlying the pretext of the concern over states' rights and 
democratic will, however, is the desire through the Federal Mar-
riage Amendment to "protect marriage and the family" against 
their purported demise.79 You made clear, President Bush, in 
your 2005 State of the Union Address that you supported a con-
stitutional amendment to protect the institution of marriage "be-
cause marriage is a sacred institution and the foundation of soci-
ety."80 Our national representatives in the House promise 
through their "Marriage Protection Act" to "continue to defend 
one of the most basic institutions of our Nation: the traditional 
family. "81 
Janes and the Word Obey, WOMEN'S TRIB., Nov. 8, 1890, in STANTON PAPERS, supra 
note 4, at, 28:725; BANNER, supra note 19, at 22. 
76. Report and Recommendations from the Task Force for Evangelical Lutheran 
Church in America Studies on Sexuality (Jan. 13, 2005), available at http://elca. 
orglfaithfuljourney/tfreport.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2006). 
77. /d. 
78. /d. The larger legislative assembly of the ELCA rejected this proposal in Au-
gust 2005. It extended the committee's timeline until 2009 to develop a social statement 
on human sexuality so that they could "get (their] minds around a very complex topic" 
given that "the history of sexual ethics is marked by continuity and change." ELCA Task 
Force on Human Sexuality Begins Anew (Feb. 10, 2006), available at http://elca.org. 
79. See, e.g., Press Release, supra note 1; 150 CONG. REC. H7898, H7898 (daily ed. 
Sept. 30, 2004) (statement of Rep. Chabot); id. at H7902 (statement of Rep. Carter); id. 
at H7904 (statement of Mr. Gingrey ). 
80. 2005 State of the Union Address, supra note 1. 
81. 150 CONG. REc. H 7741 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2004); see also 150 CoNG. REc. 
H7895 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 2004) (statement of Rep. Musgrave); see Kuykendall, supra 
note 39, at 812. 
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In my day, similar rally cries warned that without such a 
constitutional amendment on marriage "our homes, our fire-
sides, our sacred family altars, are all about to be swept away."82 
Yet I would argue that neither same-sex marriage nor divorce is 
the foe of marriage. Rather, adultery, intemperance, licentious-
ness are its foes. One might as well speak of medicine as the foe of 
health. 83 Indeed, same-sex marriage today is advocated as a cure 
for marital dissention due to its power to infuse the marital con-
struct with notions of equality and reciprocity.84 
As Professor Nan Hunter explains, same-sex marriage has 
the broad potential to dismantle the structure of gender at the 
heart of marriage law.85 It could fundamentally disrupt the gen-
dered social hierarchy and the dependent roles assigned to part-
ners based on their gendered designation of "husband" or 
"wife. "86 "What is most unsettling to the status quo about the le-
galization of lesbian and gay marriage is its potential to expose 
and denaturalize the historical construction of gender at the 
heart of marriage. "87 Professor Susan Appleton agrees, suggest-
ing that the prospect of true gender equality is "precisely the 
consequence that makes same-sex marriage so threatening. "88 I 
recognized a similar threat to the accepted gender norms of mar-
riage in the nineteenth century when women seeking divorce 
challenged the assigned sex roles of the family. I advanced this 
point in my address, "Marriage and Divorce," given in 1870 at 
the twentieth anniversary celebration of the inauguration of the 
woman's rights movement:· 
John Stuart Mill says the generality of the male sex cannot yet 
tolerate the idea of living with an equal at the fireside, and here 
is the secret of the opposition to woman's equality in the State 
and the Church; men are not ready to recognize it in the 
home. . . . Conservatism cries out we are going to destroy the 
family. Timid reformers answer, the political equality of 
woman will not change it. They are both wrong. It will entirely 
revolutionize it. When woman is man's equal the marriage rela-
tion cannot stand on the basis it is on today. But this change 
82. ECS, Divorce Versw Domestic Warfare, supra note 4, at 567. 
83. ECS, Liberal Divorce Laws, supra note 4, at 236. 
84. Susan Frelich Appleton, Missing in Action? Searching for Gender Talk in the 
Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 97 (2005); Nan D. Hunter, Mar-
riage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY 9, 12, 16 (1991). 
85. Hunter, supra note 84, at 12. 
86. Id. at 12-19. 
87. /d. at 18. 
88. Appleton, supra note 84, at 126. 
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will not destroy it. As human statutes and state constitutions did 
not create conjugal and maternal love, they cannot annul 
them . ... Change is not death, neither is progress destruction. 89 
Gender Discrimination in Marriage 
153 
Deconstructing the protection of marriage mantra reveals, 
at essence, an ideology of gender.90 As Professor Mae 
Kuykendall explains in her recent paper, The President, Gay 
Marriage, and the Constitution, these traditional gender roles to-
day tout the importance of opposite gendered male and female 
role models in the family. 9 The underlying assumption, of 
course, is that women are significantly different than men in the 
familial hierarchy.92 The Vatican recently reaffirmed these sex-
ual differences and questioned modern tendencies to "make 
homosexuality and heterosexuality virtually equivalent" thereby 
threatening the family and "its natural two parent structure of 
mother and father."93 Similar sex role arguments were made in 
the prior national movement for a restrictive standard of mar-
riage and divorce to confine women to their traditional, subju-
gated role in the family.94 
The gender ideology essential to the marriage amendment 
movements can be traced to biblical precepts of traditional gen-
der roles in marriage. The use of the Bible to endorse gender 
discrimination has been the bane of my existence. Indeed, the 
culmination of my career was the writing of my book, The 
Woman's Bible, in which I interpreted the original Greek text of 
89. ECS, Twentieth Anniversary Address, supra note 75, at 1032. 
90. Kuykendall, supra note 39, at 812. 
91. Id; see 150 CONG. REc. H7825, H7826 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2004) (statement of 
Rep. Pence); id at H7827 (statement of Rep. Davis); 150 CONG. REc. H7898, H7916 
(daily ed. Sept. 30, 2004) (statement of Rep. Garrett) ("Mothers are better able to pro-
vide certain lessons than fathers can, and fathers in tum can provide role models in ways 
that moms simply cannot."); 150 CONG. REC. H7898, H7916 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 2004) 
(statement of Rep. Johnson) ("Men and women were created to complement each other, 
and that is most obvious in successful parenting."). 
92. Kuykendall, supra note 39, at 812; Appleton, supra note 84, at 130-32 (inter-
preting the gender talk of opposite gendered parents as striving to preserve traditional 
family patriarchy, perpetuate difference acts and self-presentations of the gendered role 
models, and eliminate all gender norms and the indispensability of men). 
93. Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Collaboration of Men and 
Women in the Church and in the World, from the Offices of the Congregation for the 
Doctrine of Faith (May 31, 2004), available aJ http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregationsl 
cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20040731_collaboration_en.html. 
94. See, e.g., Felix Adler, Marriage, in MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, supra note 23, at 
62, 67 (opposing divorce for married women who should sacrifice individual vocation for 
the true vocation of motherhood). 
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the Bible using a feminist lens.95 When those who are opposed to 
all reforms can find no other argument, their last resort is the Bi-
ble. It has been interpreted to favor intemperance, slavery, capital 
punishment, and the subjection of women. 96 As I explained, the 
teachings of Jesus, 
all pointing to the complete equality of the human family, were 
too far in advance of his age to mould its public opinion. The 
Church that sprung up at that time took his name, but not his 
spirit or his principles. We must distinguish between Jesus and 
the Christian Church-one represents the ideal the race is des-
tined to attain, the other the popular sentiment of its time. 91 
The fundamental principles of Bible and Constitution alike favor 
the complete liberty and equality of all the human family, irre-
spective of sex, color, caste, class, or condition.98 An attempt to 
restrict marriage to a traditional patriarchal construct that per-
petuates inequality based on gender counter to this command of 
equality, therefore, must be cause for alarm. 
The True Relation of Marriage 
Ultimately, federal regulation of marriage turns upon a 
proper understanding of the true relation of marriage and its 
construction under the law. "Marriage is, after all, a complete 
creation of the law, secular or ecclesiastical."99 The widespread 
disagreement as to the proper legal construction of marriage 
countenances against constitutional enshrinement of a single 
standard. As I expressed in my article, Divorce Versus Domestic 
Warfare, some view marriage as a civil contract, though not gov-
erned by the laws of other contracts; some view it as a religious 
ordinance, a sacrament; some think it a relation to be regulated by 
the State, others by the Church, and still others think it should be 
left wholly to the individual. With this wide divergence of opinion 
among our leading minds, it is quite evident that we are not pre-
95. ELIZABETH CADY STANTON, THE WOMAN'S BmLE (1896); see also KATHI 
KERN, MRS. STANTON'S BmLE (2001) (analyzing the political impact of Stanton's Bible 
and placing it in historical context). 
96. ECS, Liberal Divorce Laws, supra note 4, at 242; Elizabeth Cady Stanton, A 
Woman on Divorce, OMAHA REP., Feb. 24, 1889, in STANTON PAPERS, supra note 4, at 
27:114. 
97. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Woman's Position in the Christian Church, BOSTON 
INV., May 18, 1901 (reprinting speech delivered in London in Sept. 1882), in STANTON 
PAPERS, supra note 4, at 23:263. 
98. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Letter to the Editor, The Subjection of Woman, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 9,1873, in STANTON PAPERS, supra note 4, at 17:5. 
99. Hunter, supra note 84, at 13. 
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pared for a nationallaw. 100 My own view is that marriage should 
be transformed from covenant to contract in accordance with my 
liberal feminist theory of individual autonomy. 101 
I began my attack on the existing legal construct of marriage 
by debunking the judicial myth of "marriage as a contract" to 
reveal its conservative underpinnings.102 The judicial rhetoric 
that "marriage everywhere is regarded as a civil contract" failed 
to match the legal treatment of such relations.103 The courts did 
not permit the modification of marital contracts between hus-
band and wife, nor did they allow for termination of marital con-
tracts by divorce. Courts did not follow the basic doctrinal re-
quirements for entering a contract, recognizing contracts in the 
absence of voluntary consent. Thus, my critique of the judicial 
language of marriage-as-contract, first crafted in an 1854 speech, 
"focused not on the abstract construct of marriage as a civil con-
tract, but rather on the contradictions inherent in the ways that 
courts used the construct."104 For the long-term effect of such 
pseudo-contractual reasoning trapped women in marital rela-
tions that deprived them of property and self-sovereignty, and 
from which they could not legally exit. 105 
For these reasons, I opposed judicial endorsement of com-
mon-law marriages that recognized marriage apart from the pub-
lic intent of such parties to legally solemnize such relations. 106 I 
argued that marriage should be treated the same as all other 
contracts: 
If you regard marriage as a civil contract, then let it be subject 
to the same laws which control all other contracts. Do not 
make it a kind of half-human, half-divine institution, which 
you may build up but cannot regulate. Do not, by your special 
legislation for this one kind of contract, involve yourselves in 
the grossest absurdities and contradictions. 107 
100. ECS, Divorce Versus Domestic Warfare, supra note 4, at 561; see also ECS, 
Homogeneous Laws, supra note 4, at 408. 
101. Clark, supra note 9, at 26. 
102. Ariela R. Dubler, Note, Governing Through Contract: Common Law Marriage 
in the Nineteenth Century, 107 YALE L. J. 1885, 1889, 1912 (1998). 
103. Meister v. Moore,% U.S. 76, 78 (1877); Jewell v. Jewell, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 219 
(1843). 
104. See Dubler, supra note 102, at 1909. 
105. Id. at 1908-11. 
106. ld. at 1909-10. 
107. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Address to the Legislature of New York, Feb. 14, 1854, 
in STANTON PAPERS, supra note 4, at 9:976. 
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I supported stricter laws regulating the age of consent for 
entry into marriage above the common law of the nineteenth 
century allowing a girl of twelve and a boy of fourteen to consent 
to marriage. 108 On what principle, I would ask, should the party 
on whom all the inevitable hardships of marriage must fall, be the 
younger to enter the relation? Girls do not get their full growth 
until twen~-five, and are wholly unfit at fifteen for the trials of 
maternity.1 9 
In 1888, the United States Supreme Court clarified the hazy 
misimpression created by the marriage-as-contract language in 
endorsing the status construct of marriage.110 In Maynard v. Hill, 
the Court cited with favor state court opinions explaining the ex-
tra-contractual nature of marriage: "The statute declares it a civil 
contract, as distinguished from a religious sacrament, and makes 
the element of consent necessary to its legal validity, but its na-
ture, attributes, and distinguishing features it does not interfere 
with or attempt to define. It is declared a civil contract for cer-
tain purposes, but it is not thereby made synonymous with the 
word 'contract' employed in the common law or statutes."111 The 
Supreme Court held that marriage is "more than a mere con-
tract"; it is an "institution subject to the sovereign power of the 
state to maintain the morals and civilization of society."112 In so 
holding, the Court affirmed the state's ability to control the 
marital institution, thereby enhancinf support for proponents of 
nationalized control over marriage.11 
However, in the one hundred years since Maynard, the 
dominant trend in the law has been towards conceptualizing 
marriage as contract rather than status. "The rise of the marriage 
contract, with its recognition of some power of personal choice 
and some right of individual liberty accorded to women, is the 
suggestive clue to the course of social evolution which in any 
given era outlines the terms of legal marriage. "114 Today, the 
108. ECS, Liberal Divorce Laws, supra note 4, at 234. 
109. Id.; Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Girls and Maturity, PIONEER, July 9, 1870, in 
STANTON PAPERS, supra note 4, at 15:85; Review of Stanton's Speech "Our Girls," WASH. 
COUNTY PRESS (lA), Feb. 21,1880, in STANTON PAPERS, supra note 4, at 21:110. 
110. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888). 
111. Jd. at 212-13. 
112 /d. at 211. 
113. Cf. 150 CONG. REc. H7898, H7903 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 2004) (statement of Rep. 
Brady) ("I believe the institution of marriage is a sacred union. It predates Congress and 
the constitution. Marriage is not simply a legal contract. For all its flaws, it is a covenant 
that truly binds individuals and families to each other and has, for centuries, provided 
social stability, not only for our country but for our culture."). 
114. Anna Garlin Spencer, Problems of Marriage and Divorce, in MARRIAGE AND 
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construct of marriage as a contract is clearly evidenced by the 
uniform acceptance of no-fault divorce, prenuptial contracts, and 
separation agreements. 115 Given this significant legal evolution, 
it would seem that the government's ability to continue to con-
trol the marriage relation and its attendant privileges is more 
tenuous than ever. For in the absence of an institutional status 
for marriage, the state is divested of its power to restrict the in-
dividual freedoms and privileges of the partners choosing the 
marital relation.116 
I have argued since 1860 that marriage should be considered 
a contract made by equal parties to lead an equal life, with equal 
restraints and privileges on either side. 117 As I repeated thirty 
years later, the question of Divorce, like Marriage, should be set-
tled as to its most sacred relations, by the parties themselves, nei-
ther the State nor the Church having any right to intermeddle 
therein. As to property and children, it must be viewed and regu-
lated as a civil contract. 118 Thus, I departed from the contempo-
raneous pronouncements of the U.S. Supreme Court in con-
structing the true relation of marriage as one of individual 
contract rather than governmental status. 
I have been accused of sayin~ "the State has nothing to do 
with either marriage or divorce."1 But that is not the argument 
I make. I have recognized the wisdom of laws governing the mar-
riage relation-any person of common sense must see the neces-
sity of laws. 120 I argue, however, that marriage should be regarded 
as a civil contract, entirely under the jurisdiction of the State. The 
less latitude the Church has in our temporal affairs, the better. 121 
The state retains a role in regulating the marriage relationship in 
the same manner as all contracts, ensuring that the contract is 
created based on the clear intent of the parties and providing for 
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the consequences of the breach of that contract. 122 As I have 
said, marriage should be subject to the restraints and privileges of 
all other contracts. The law properly regulates for the breach of 
marital contracts governing the rights of property, inheritance, 
support, and alimony. 123 
My views on the true relation of marriage as one of con-
tract, rather than status or covenant find support today in the 
scholarship of Professor Martha Fineman.12 Fineman has as-
serted that "adults should be free to fashion the terms of their 
own relationships and rely on contract as the means of so doing, 
effectively replacing the marital status."125 In her view, "there is 
no reason for the state to be involved in the articulation and im-
position of the [marital) terms any more than it would be in-
volved in the enforcement of contracts in general. "126 Professor 
Fineman thus takes a page from my book in arguing that the law 
should substitute the construct of contract for that of status in 
regulating intimate adult relations such as marriage. 
Others have criticized my construct of marriage as a con-
tract, prophesying the doom of marriage as the foundation of 
civilization and the propagation of meretricious relations. 127 In-
deed the accusation of "free love" and the promiscuous relations 
it implies have often been hurled at women's rights advocates to 
discredit the movement seeking equality in intimate relations. 128 
Free love is the greatest of all bugbears to Woman's Rights. So far 
as I am concerned I have always been too busy to think about 
such a thing, and have never found time to love more than one 
man. 129 I have been asked if I believe in "free love." If by "free 
love" you mean promiscuity, I do not. I believe in monogamic 
marriage. If by "free love" you mean freedom in love, then I be-
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lieve. 130 Whenever compulsion and restraint, whether of the law or 
of a dogmatic and oppressive public opinion, are removed, what-
ever results will be free love. 131 
Clearly then, I do not argue against marriage itself, as dem-
onstrated by my own marriage of over half a century. Our trou-
bles do not arise so much from marriage in itself, for that seems to 
be the natural state of the human family, and there is no doubt 
more happiness in marriage than out of it. 132 But is marriage a 
success? Yes as much of a success as any other human institution. 
Like government and religion it is an outgrowth of ourselves, im-
perfect in our present stage of development, but improving as in-
dividual men and women grow in knowledge and wisdom. Before 
we shall have happy marriages we must educate men and women 
into a clear idea of individual rights; the exact limit of their own 
and the vital point where they begin to infringe on the rights of 
another. 133 
I hope that this recollection of the past has shed some light 
upon the dark question of denying equality of rights to citizens 
of the United States in the marriage relation. From these consid-
erations our wisest course seems to be to leave these questions 
wholly to the civil rather than to the cannon law, the jurisdiction 
of the several States rather than the nation. 134 The drastic mistakes 
threatened in the past by proposed marriage amendments were 
averted by the collective wisdom for more than sixty years. It is 
my hope that such collective wisdom will once again prevail and 
block attempts to enshrine a single view of marriage into the 
United States Constitution for all people, for all time. 
130. Letter from Elizabeth Cady Stanton to Elizabeth Miller (Aug. 11, 1880), in 
STANTON PAPERS, supra note 4, at 21:354. 
131. DuBois, supra note 9 (reprinting and annotating Stanton's speech on free love 
entitled "On Marriage and Divorce" from 1870). 
132. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Is Marriage a Success?, OMAHA REP., Mar. 24, 1889, in 
STANTON PAPERS, supra note 4, at 27:142; Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Is Marriage a Suc-
cess? A Symposium, UNION SIGNAL, May 2, 1889, in STANTON PAPERS, supra note 4, at 
27:180; see also Twentieth Anniversary Address, supra note 74. 
133. ECS, Is Marriage a Success?, supra note 132. 
134. ECS, Homogenous Laws, supra note 4, at 408. 
